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Comments
Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.:
Upholding Compulsory Arbitration of ERISA
Claims Properly Treats All Investors Equally
Pension plan trustee Frank Bird invested plan assets total-
ling $62,206 with the brokerage firm Shearson Leh-
man/American Express (Shearson) after signing Shearson's
standard customer agreement' containing a compulsory arbitra-
tion clause.2 After Shearson made fifty-five transactions in
twenty-two months, the plan's assets dwindled to $13,428. Bird
sued Shearson for excessive trading under the Securities Ex-
change Act (Exchange Act)4 and for breach of fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA).5 Finding the arbitration agreement valid, the federal dis-
trict court held that the Exchange Act claim required
arbitration, but refused to enforce arbitration for the ERISA
claim.6
3. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc, 871 F.2d 292, 293-94 (2d
Cir.), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989) (remanding for further consideration in
light of Rodriguez de (uijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917
(1989)).
2. The clause read, in pertinent part-
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy
arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for
me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by ar-
bitration in accordance with the rules... of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Directors of the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. as I
may elect.... Judgement upon any award rendered by the arbri-
trators [sic] may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
This agreement to arbitrate does not apply to any controversy with a
public customer for which a remedy may exist pursuant to an ex-
pressed or implied right of action under certain of the federal securi-
ties laws.
rd. at 294 n.2.
3. Id at 294. Shearson generated a commission on each transaction and
allegedly made many high risk investments. I&
4. The complaint specifically charged "churning," or excess trading of an
account, in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1988), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1988). Bird, 871 F.2d at 294.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
6. Bird, 871 F.2d at 294.
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The Second Circuit in Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American
EXpress, Inc.7 affirmed the district court, holding that statutory
ERISA claims are not subject to compulsory arbitration
notwithstanding a valid arbitration agreement$ The Supreme
Court granted certiorari,9 vacated the judgment, and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of Rodriguez de
Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inal'0
Overcrowded court dockets and skyrocketing litigation
costs have made arbitration an increasingly popular alternative
for dispute resolution." The Supreme Court in recent years
has shown increasing support for the parallel national policies
favoring the enforcement of promises to arbitrate in both com-
mercial and labor agreements.' 2 The Court has also consist-
ently recognized ERISA's underlying policy of protecting
private employee benefit plan participants.13 ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions create a dilemma, however, when ER-
ISA disputes involve arbitration agreements because courts
must reconcile the dual congressional goals of enforcement of
private promises to arbitrate and judicial enforcement of ER-
ISA statutory rights.14 The Bird case presented this dilemma
7. 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989).
8. Id at 294.
9. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989).
10. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989). The Supreme Court issued the Rodriguez opin-
ion two months after the Second Circuit decided the Bird case. Rodriguez
overruled past precedent by holding statutory claims under the Securities Act
of 1933 subject to compulsory arbitration under a valid arbitration agreement.
I.cL at 1918.
11. Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the En~forcement of
Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 394 (1987). As an example, the
number of commercial and labor cases arbitrated under the auspices of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) doubled between 1975 and 1985.
Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 79.
12. See infra notes 16-83 and accompanying text. See also Bendixsen, En-
forcing the Duty to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement Rejected in Bankruptcy: Preserving the Parties' Bargain and Na-
tional Labor Policy, 8 INDus. REL. L.J. 401, 441-42 (1986) (national labor policy
favoring arbitral dispute resolution "one of twin pillars which include a na-
tional policy to enforce commercial arbitration promises").
13. See eg., Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund
v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569-70 (1985); Nacbman Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1980).
14. Many collective bargaining agreements contain mandatory arbitration
provisions. Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration to Avoid Litigation Under ER-
ISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 216 (1975). Due to judicial interpretation of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), these agreements also
often simultaneously include ERISA pension plans. The IMRA requires em-
ployers and unions to bargain in "good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" LMRA § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), (d), 29
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by asking whether Congress intended non-waivable federal
court access for parties asserting statutory ERISA violations,
despite the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.' 5
This Comment examines the Second Circuit's attempt to
reconcile the policies underlying ERISA with the federal policy
favoring enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements.
Part I explores judicial treatment of agreements to arbitrate in
both the commercial and the labor realms. Part I also exam-
ines ERISA's underlying policies as well as judicial treatment
of its overall scheme. Part II details the Second Circuit's Bir i
decision. Part III argues that the Second Circuit erred in effec-
tively ignoring recent commercial arbitration precedents, in-
stead relying improperly on older labor arbitration decisions of
questionable applicability. This Comment concludes that equal
protection for all securities investors coupled with modern com-
mercial arbitration jurisprudence mandates the enforcement of
valid commercial arbitration agreements for statutory ERISA
claims.
L TENSION BETWEEN ERISA PROCEDURAL
GUARANTEES AND THE FEDERAL POLICY
SUPPORTING THE ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. COMMECIA. ARBTRATION
The Supreme Court has taken a very deferential approach
to commercial arbitration in recent years.' 6 This newfound
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1988). In Inland Steel Co. v. 1XLRB, the court
held pension plans to be "Wages" and "conditions of employment" and hence
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 170 F2d 247, 250-51 (7th Cir.
1948), cert; denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
ERISA pension plan administrators also invest a large share of pension
plan assets in securities. Pension funds 'hold more than a quarter of all the
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and account for an even
greater share of daily stock transactions." Wall St. J., Sept. 25,1989, at 1, col.
5. The brokerage firms handling these funds commonly require customers to
sign brokerage agreements containing predispute arbitration provisions. See
Katsoris, The Aritration of a Public Secu7ities Dispute, 53 FoRDHAM L. REV.
279, 292 (1984). Thus, this practice has created another instance in which ER
ISA plans and arbitration agreements commonly coexist
15. Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Incm, 871 F.2d at 295.
16. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1918 (1989) (approving use of commercial arbitration to resolve claims
under Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. Mcahon, 482
U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (enforcing predispute arbitration agreement for claims
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under Racketeer Influenced and
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support for arbitration is diametrically opposed to the Ameri-
can judiciary's historical attitude of open hostility toward arbi-
tration agreements. 7 Following precedent from the English
common law, American courts historically refused to enforce
arbitration agreements on the theory that such agreements
ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. 18
1. The Federal Arbitration Act
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)'9 in
1925 to put arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts,20 forcing the reversal of longstanding judicial
animosity,2 The FAA provides that written arbitration agree-
ments shall be valid, unless sufficient grounds exist to find any
contract invalid.P It requires courts to stay their proceedings
on any issue determined to be within the scope of a valid arbi-
tration agreementz s and it empowers federal district courts to
compel arbitration of arbitrable issues when a party improperly
Corrupt Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (holding antitrust claims in international
context arbitrable pursuant to predispute arbitration agreement); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (requiring federal district court
to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims pendent to non-arbitrable claim
upon motion of party); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974)
(enforcing predispute agreement to arbitrate Exchange Act claim by parties
to international contract).
17. See Bedell, Harrison & Grant, Arbitrability: Current Developments in
the Interpretation and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 1, 1 (1987).
18. H.L REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924) (House Report ac-
companying the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925). See, eg., Cocalis v. Nazlides,
308 Ill. 152, 158-60, 139 N.E. 95, 98-99 (1923) (holding predispute arbitration
agreement contrary to public policy and thus invalid because it attempted to
divest the courts of their jurisdiction); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379
(1868) (same).
19. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
20. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511 (quoting HR. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 2 (1924)).
21. Id at 510.
22. Section 2 of the Act provides:
A written provision in... a contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to ar-
bitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, trans-
action, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
23. Id. § 3.
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refuses to abide by an arbitration agreement. The FAA also
limits judicial review of arbitration awards to situations involv-
ing fraud in procuring the award, partiality or corruption on
the part of the arbitrator, gross misconduct by the arbitrator
prejudicing the rights of any party, or the arbitrator's failure to
render a final decision.25 To these four statutory grounds for
judicial review, the Supreme Court has added a fifth common
law ground - the arbitrator's "manifest disregard" of the appli-
cable law.as
2. Commercial arbitration in the securities industry
As a consequence of the efficiency and expertise associated
with arbitration, predispute arbitration clauses commonly ap-
pear in commercial contracts today.27 Arbitration boasts partic-
ularly widespread use in the resolution of securities disputes,
due to a common practice in the industry wherein brokers re-
quire new customers to sign brokerage agreements containing
mandatory arbitration clauses.P These arbitration clauses re-
quire brokers and investors to submit to arbitration all future
disputes arising between them.30
Two statutes, the Securities Act of 193331 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,32 presently govern most securities
transactions in the United States.a Both acts created private
causes of action, enabling investors in certain circumstances to
sue for damages.3 In the absence of an arbitration agreement,
24. 1&.§ 4.
25. Id. § 10(a)-Cd).
26. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987).
27. Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222,1224 (2d
Cir. 1980).
28. Fletcher, supra note 11, at 394.
29. See Comment, Securities Arbitration - The Supreme Court Resolves
the Issue of Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Inves-
tor Contracts Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 73 IOWA L. REv.
449, 449 & rm.1-2 (1988).
30. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1988)).
32. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78a-781 (1988)).
33. Comment, supra note 29, at 450. Congress passed these acts after the
Great Depression in part to protect investors. See Shell, The Role of Public
Law in Private Dispute Resolution. Rections on Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 404 & n.47; H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
34. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,431 (1953) (noting existence of private
cause of action under Securities Act of 1933); Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
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investors have the unquestioned right to bring securities claims
in federal district court.s5
The general scope of the FAA includes arbitration agree-
ments covering securities transactions on national exchanges.36
Since passage of the federal securities acts, however, confusion
has persisted over the effect of the FAA on private actions
brought pursuant to these acts when a brokerage agreement
contains an arbitration clause.37 Three recent Supreme Court
decisions have put these questions to rest by upholding the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements for claims under the se-
curities acts, thereby precluding such investors from bringing
an action in federal district courtsa
3. Judicial treatment of commercial arbitration agreements
under the Federal Arbitration Act
The Supreme Court set out its current position on commer-
cial arbitration in Shearson/American E'press, Inc. v. McMa-
hon,9 a landmark decision for the securities industry. Calling
for stringent judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements 0
in compliance with the federal policy embodied in the FAA
favoring commercial arbitration,' the Court noted that this
duty of enforcement does not diminish for statutory claims.42
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (upholding an implied private right of action
under § 10(b) of Exchange Act); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
513-14 (1974) (noting existence of implied private cause of action under Ex-
change Act).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
36. Katsoris, supra note 14, at 292 n.88 (stating that the FAA applies to all
transactions involving interstate commerce, and most securities transactions
involve interstate commerce).
37. Comment, supim note 29, at 451.
38. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/An. Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917,1922 (1989) (overruling prior Supreme Court decision by approving use of
commercial arbitration to resolve claims under Securities Act of 1933); Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (enforcing predis-
pute arbitration agreement for claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974) (enforcing predispute
agreement to arbitrate Exchange Act claims by parties to international
contract).
39. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
40. Ia at 226 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
41. The FAA establishes a "federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments." I& (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
42. Absent the type of fraud or unequal bargaining power that would es-
tablish grounds for the revocation of any contract, the Court concluded that
ARBITRATION
The federal judiciary did not adopt this deferential posture
overnight. After enactment of the FAA, the courts carved out
several major exceptions to the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion, most notably in the areas of securities,4 antitrust,44 bank-
ruptcy, and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).4 The courts have begun to pare
down these exceptions only within the last fifteen years. 7
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan 48 held that
the Securities Act confers the right to select a judicial forum,
and a party to an arbitration agreement retains this right. 49
Subsequently, many federal courts extended the WiZko reason-
ing to claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.s° Courts
the FAA treats agreements to arbitrate statutory claims on par with any other
arbitration agreement. IX
The Court did recognize, however, that a sufficient showing of contrary
congressional intent for a specific statutory right could override the FAA's
mandate. d. at 227. The Court first announced the test for construing a stat-
ute's arbitrability in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). The test consists of scrutinizing the statute's text, its
legislative history, and its underlying policies and purposes for evidence of a
congreksonal intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements for the
resolution of statutory disputes. Id- Any uncertainty over the FAA's scope,
however, "should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Memo-
iial Hos., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
43. See, e-g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,438 (1953) (holding claims arising
under 1933 Securities Act not subject to arbitration); Surman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61-62 (8th Cir. 1984) (following Wilko to
hold claims arising under § 10(b) of 1934 Securities Exchange Act nonarbitra-
ble); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 828-29
(10th Cir. 1978) (same).
44. See, eg., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
576 F.2d 116, 117-19 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding antitrust claims nonarbitrable);
Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1968) (same).
45. See, eg., Braniff Airways, Inc v. United Air Lines, Inc., 33 Bankr. 33,
34 (Bankr. ND. Tex. 1983) (holding bankruptcy issues nonarbitrable); Coar v.
Brown, 29 Bankr. 806, 807 (N.D. IL. 1983) (same).
46. See, ag., Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Beacon Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 735,
738 (WD.N.C. 1984) (holding RICO claims nonarbitrable); S-. Mineracao da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Intl Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(same); see also Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, In=, 602 F.
Supp. 867, 870 (WD. Pa. 1985) (recognizing the nonarbitrability of RICO
claims).
47. See irfra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
48. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
49. Id at 438. The Wilko Court based its holding in part on its suspicion
that arbitration could shortchange statutory rights. Id. at 435-36.
50. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 413 n.142. The nonwaiver and jurisdic-
tional provisions in the Exchange Act are comparable to the Securities Act
provisions on which the Supreme Court relied to preclude arbitration in
Wilco; furthermore, the two statutes share the purpose of investor protection.
19No]
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also applied this rationale to numerous other statutory claims
in commercial cases.5'
In 1974, the Supreme Court's present aggressive posture in
support of the FAA finally began to emerge. In Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co., 52 the Court held that claims under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act involving international business
transactions were subject to arbitration.P The Court's decision
rested primarily on concerns of international comity and on the
necessity of prospective arbitration agreements for interna-
tional trade.5 ' The Court's next move came in Dean Witt-r
Based on these similarities, many lower courts extended the Wilko rationale
to § 10(b) claims. Shell, supra note 33, at 404 & nn.45-47.
5L Using Wilko-type rationale, courts held the particular statutory
claims at issue nonarbitrable for "public policy" reasons. Shell, supr note 33,
at 404 & nn.48-51. See also, ag., supra notes 43-46 (citing major exceptions to
the federal policy favoring arbitration). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
for example, used "public policy" as its rationale to articulate a basis for the
antitrust arbitration exception. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F2d 821, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1968). The decision rested on four
grounds. First, private parties play an important supplementary role in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws through private actions for treble damages.
"Second, 'the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust dis-
putes may be contracts of adhesion militates against automatic forum determi-
nation by contract."' Third, antitrust issues are typically complicated:
"requir[ing] sophisticated legal and economic analysis," and thus are
"ill.adapted to strengths of the arbitral process, ie., expedition, mini-
mal requirements of written rationale, simplicity, resort to basic con-
cepts of common sense and simple equity." Finally, just as "issues of
war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals,... deci-
sions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be
lodged in arbitrators chosen from the business community....
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632
(1985) (outlining the reasoning underlying the American Safety decision)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d
155, 162 (1st Cir. 1983)). See American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-28.
Lower courts uniformly followed the American Safety decision. See, eg.,
Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117
(7th Cir. 1978) (following American Safety in finding antitrust claims not sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974)
(same); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971) (same); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto
Co., 396 F.2d 710,715-16 (9th Cir. 1968) (same); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 10, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977) (same). The antitrust exception became known as the American
Safety doctrine. Bedell, supra note 17, at 16.
52. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
53. Id at 513.
54. Id. at 515-20. Dictum in Justice Stewart's opinion foreshadowed even
further erosion of the Wilko exception by raising a "colorable argument" for
rejection of the Wilko rationale as applied to domestic § 10(b) claims as well.
Id at 513-14.
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Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. s In Byrd, the Court held that the FAA
requires courts to compel arbitration of arbitrable state law
claims even when such claims arise from the same transaction
and are "intertwined" with nonarbitrable federal claims. Fol-
lowing Scherk and Byrd, the lower courts split over the arbi-
trability of section 10(b) Exchange Act claims and RICO
claims,-7 but uniformly maintained the nonarbitrability of do-
mestic antitrust claimsPs
The next major commercial arbitration precedent, Mitsub-
ishi Motors Cowp. v. Soler Chrysler.Plymouth, Inc.,s9 cast some
doubt on the lower courts' stance on domestic antitrust arbitra-
tion. The Court held that, at least for international disputes,
antitrust claims were arbitrable.60 Setting forth an "arbi-
trability test" for statutes, the Mitsubishi Court clarified that
the FAA did not disfavor agreements to arbitrate statutory
claims.61
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon 62 finally settled the question of the
arbitrability of both RICO claims and section 10(b) Exchange
Act claims in favor of arbitrationP The Court interpreted the
Wilko decision as grounded primarily on the Court's earlier
suspicion that commercial arbitration was "inadequate to en-
force the statutory rights created by § 12(2)" of the Securities
Act, and not on a congressional intention to preclude waiver of
access to the judicial forum by securities investors.64 The Court
found this suspicion inapplicable to present day securities
arbitration.Ps
55. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
56. Id. at 217. The Court held that the Act compelled arbitration even if
the result was the 'possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in
different forums." I. In a concurring opinion, Justice White questioned the
mechanical application of Willco to Exchange Act disputes. Id. at 224-25
(White, J., concurring). See aZso supra note 54 .(highlighting dictum in
Sclzerlc).
57. Shell, supra note 33, at 406 n.68 (citing cases).
58. Id. at 406 n.69 (citing cases).
59. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
60. Id- at 640. Weighing the American Safety doctrine against a strong be-
lief in the efficacy of arbitration for international commercial dispute resolu-
tion, the Court refuted each of American Sqfet's four grounds in turn. Id- at
632-36.
61. Id. at 627. See supra note 42.
62. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
63. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242.
64. Id. at 228-29.
65. Id. at 231-34
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The most recent chapter in the Supreme Court's campaign
for commercial arbitration came in Rodriguez de Quidas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.6 The Rodriguez Court used
the groundwork laid in Scherk and McMahon to explicitly over-
rule Wilko v. Swan by holding section 12(2) Securities Act
claims subject to compulsory arbitration under a valid arbitra-
tion agreement. The Court declared that Wiko was 'incor-
rectly decided" and "inconsistent with the prevailing uniform
construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration
agreements in the setting of business transactions."8 7
66. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
67. IHi at 1922. In Rodriguez, securities customers signed a standard cus-
tomer agreement containing a compulsory arbitration clause. Id at 1918-19.
Despite this agreement, the customers sued the broker in federal district court
wheA the investments went sour. I& at 1919. The district court ordered all
claims except for the § 12(2) Securities Act claim to be submitted to arbitra-
tion, and, based on Wiko v. Swan, held that the Securities Act claim must
remain in the judicial forum. I- The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that
the Supreme Court's "subsequent decisions have reduced Wilko to 'obsoles-
cence.'" id. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845
F2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1988)).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reversal. Relying on
Scherk, Byrd, Mitsubishi, and McMahon, the Court first emphasized that "'the
old judicial hostility to arbitration!" has steadily eroded over time, particularly
in the Court's recent decisions enforcing arbitration agreements for claims
under the Exchange Act, RICO, and the antitrust laws. Id at 1920 (quoting
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942)). To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion that arbitration failed to
adequately protect substantive rights, the decision was not in step with the
Court's current strong endorsement of the FAA. Id
The Court also found that the Securities Act's liberal provisions for ser-
vice of process, venue, and amount in controversy, while admittedly facilitat-
ing suits by securities buyers, were present in other federal statutes not
interpreted to preclude compulsory arbitration, specifically the Exchange Act,
RICO, and the antitrust laws. Id. On the other hand, the Securities Act's
grant of concurrent jurisdiction, compared with the Exchange Act's exclusive
federal jurisdiction considered in McM'ahon, actually supports the arbitrability
of claims because, in effect, it affords the buyer broader freedom in selecting a
forum. Id- at 1921.
In rejecting Wilko's aversion to arbitration for securities dispute resolu-
tion, the Court summarily relied on McMahon's lengthy description of the re-
cent expansion of the SEC's authority to oversee and regulate arbitration
procedures in the securities industry. I Finally, the Court stressed the
strong language in the FAA favoring strict enforcement of agreements to arbi-
trate, and declared that plaintiffs had not carried their burden of showing that
Congress intended to preclude waiver of the judicial forum for Securities Act
claims. a
The Supreme Court issued the Rodriguez opinion two months after the
Second Circuit's Bird decision. When the Supreme Court considered Bird on
certiorari, the Court vacated the Second Circuit judgment and, without further
comment, remanded the case for further consideration in light of Rodriguez.
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B. ARBrRATION UNDER CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS AND THE FEDERAL LABOR LAWS
The FAA expressly excludes from its scope labor-manage-
ment contractual collective bargaining disputes.P The judiciary
nonetheless espouses a strong policy of deferral to arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements that parallels its posi-
tion on arbitration in the commercial realm.
1. The Steelworkers Trilogy
The Supreme Court firmly established this policy in three
landmark decisions known as the Steelworkers Tlogy.6 9
Through these decisions, the Court instructed the judiciary to
defer to arbitration in disputes concerning the meaning, inter-
pretation, and application of collective bargaining agreements,
and to resolve any doubts as to arbitrability in favor of cover-
age.70 The Supreme Court reasoned that if courts were allowed
to review and overturn arbitration decisions, "[t]he federal pol-
icy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be under-
mined. '71 In the years following the Steelworkers Tiilogy, all
disputes arising from collectively bargained pension plans were
subject to binding arbitration unless found to be expressly ex-
empted from contractual arbitration coverage.7j 2
Id at 1917. See also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (additional dis-
cussion of Supreme Court ruling in Bird).
68. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (stating that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce").
69. The three decisions of the Steelworkers Trily are United Steelwork-
ers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (holding that
courts should decline to review merits of arbitration award under collective
bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 58283 (1960) (holding that judicial inquiry must be limited to
question of whether parties agreed to arbitrate grievance, and doubts concern-
ing interpretation of scope of arbitration clause must be resolved in favor of
coverage); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)
(holding courts confined to issue of whether grievance is covered by arbitra-
tion agreement; court may not weigh merits of grievance).
70. Comment, ERTSA Arbitration - Participant in Unfunded Deferred
Compensation Plan Required to Submit Claim to Enforce Terms of Plan to Ar-
bitration, 31 VHr. L. REV. 13.66,1176 n.45 (1986); see also supra note 69.
71. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596.
"TMhe finality essential to making arbitration a workable grievance resolution
process would be eliminated." Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pen-
sfon Arbitration in the 1980's, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 269, 276 (1980)
(discussing the Court's reasoning in Enterprise.Wheel).
72. Schneider, supra note 71, at 276-77 & n.46.
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2. The ALexander Trilogy - a departure from the deferral
policy
Notwithstanding its longstanding policy of deferral to col-
lective bargaining arbitration and its emerging and equally
strong policy in the last two decades favoring commercial arbi-
tration, the Supreme Court has handed down three decisions
since 1974 in conflict with these policies, 73 all in the collective
bargaining context. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,74 the
Court held that, despite an adverse arbitration decision, an indi-
vidual can bring a wrongful termination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 5 Seven years later,
the Court held in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys-
tems 76 that claims pursuant to minimum wage provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are not compulsorily arbitra-
ble.77 Finally, in McDonald v. City of West Branch,71 the Court
held that federal courts may not accord preclusive effect to un-
appealed arbitration awards in subsequent suits brought under
42 U.S.C. section 1983.79
The Court based the three decisions on similar reasoning,
focusing initially on the need to distinguish between collec-
tively bargained contractual rights and individual statutory
rights.80 The Court also stressed the specialized character of
73. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984); Barren-
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981); Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
74. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
75. The Supreme Court held that an employee's right to a trial de novo on
a Title VII claim is not foreclosed by prior submission to binding arbitration of
a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement's nondiscrimination clause
based on the same facts. Id. at 59-60.
76. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
77. Reversing the lower court decision, the Court held that the employ-
ees' prior voluntary submission of their contractual claim to binding arbitra-
tion did not bar their subsequent FLSA claim in federal court. I at 745.
78. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
79. The Court stated that in a § 1983 action, "a federal court should not
afford res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an award in an arbitration
proceeding brought pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment." I at 292.
80. All three cases involved grievances supported by both contractual and
statutory provisions. See supra notes 75, 77 & 79. In each case, the Court rec-
ognized the petitioner's individual statutory right as independent of the collec-
tive bargaining process and, therefore, not precluded by collective bargaining
arbitration. See Alezander, 415 U.S. at 52; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745; McDon-
ald, 466 U.S. at 290. In contrast, the three cases in the Steelworkers Trilogy,
through which the Supreme Court originally established its policy of defer-
ence to labor arbitration, involved questions of contractual interpretation only.
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each statutory right, citing its constitutional dimensions,8' the
high priority placed upon it by Congress,82 or the individual
minimum substantive guarantee it providedPes Finally, a review
of arbitration's weaknesses and limitations lent additional sup-
port to the Court's decisions.8 Confusion over the scope of
these three decisions has caused discord among the lower
courts as to the enforceability of commercial arbitration agree-
ments for claims under not only ERISA, but other statutes as
wel.as
Castle & Lansing, Arbitration of Labor Grievances Brought Under Contrac-
tual and StatutM Provisions: The Suprenie Court Grows Less Deferential to
the Arbitration Process, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 49, 66-67 (1983).
81. Relying on Alexander and Barrentine, the Court determined in Mc-
Donald that arbitration "cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial
proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that
§ 1983 is designed to safeguard." McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290.
The Alexander Court noted in dictum that "the resolution of statutory or
constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts,.. especially ...
with respect to Title VII," since its interpretation requires 'reference to public
law concepts." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57.
82. The Alexander Court emphasized that in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
"Congress indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to be
of the 'highest priority."' 415 U.S. at 47 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park
Enter. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). To effectuate this policy, Title VII pro-
vides several independent and non-preclusive forums for employment discrim-
ination claims: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
state and local agencies, and federal courts. I.& at 47-48. The Court concluded
that Title Vi's purpose and procedures strongly suggest that final arbitration
of a grievance does not preclude a subsequent statutory claim. I& at 49.
83. The Barrentine Court noted that while Congress designed the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) to encourage employees to protect their
interests collectively, it intended the FLSA "to give specific rinimum protec-
tions to individual workers" by ensuring that each employee receive a fair
wage. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739. The Court concluded that "different consid-
erations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a
statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers." Ik. at 737. Additionally, the Court recognized that in the context of
collective bargaining, sometimes the union must sacrifice an individual's rights
for the collective benefit. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19; Barrentine, 450
U.S. at 742; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291.
84. The Alexander decision emphasized several shortfalls of arbitration in
protecting Title VII rights, including the specialized competence of arbitrators
primarily relating to "the law of the shop," not to the interpretation of federal
statutes. Alexander, 415 US. at 57. The Court's list of arbitration's weak-
nesses also included procedural informality; relaxed application of evidentiary
rules; often severely limited or nonexistent discovery, compulsory process,
cross examination, and testimony under oath; and no obligation on the arbitra-
tor to give reasons for an award. Id. at 57-58; see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at
743-45 (relying on the same arbitral inadequacies); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-
91 (relying on Alexanders analysis of arbitration's weaknesses).
85. Some courts have relied on the Alexander decisions to hold claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) not coin-
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C. ERISA
Prompted by the extent of the national work force's reli-
ance on employee benefit plans,s6 the magnitude of plan
assets,8 7 and the pervasiveness of fund abuse and mismanage-
ment,ss Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.89 To assure the equi-
pulsorily arbitrable in the commercial arbitration context, while other courts
have disagreed. See Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding ADEA claims nonarbitrable in a non-collective bargaining set-
ting); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543, 547
(D.N.J. 1987) (same). But see Pihl v. Thomson McKinnon See-, Inc., 48 Fair
Empl Prac. Cas. (BNA) 922, 924-26 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding ADEA claims ar-
bitrable in non-collective bargaining setting under Federal Arbitration Act and
Mitsubishi).
Similar conflicts exist over Title VII and FLSA claims outside of the col-
lective bargaining setting, as well as Minnesota Human Rights Act claims and
New York Human Rights Law claims outside collective bargaining. See Swen-
son v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-09 (8th Cir. 1988)
(reasoning that Alexander, Barrentine and McDonald render Title VII and
Minnesota Human Rights Act claims outside of the collective bargaining set-
ting nonarbitrable). But see Steele v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 701 F. Supp. 407,
408 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding claims under the FLSA arbitrable under Mitsubishi,
McMahon, and FAA by rejecting Barrentine's applicability in non-collective
bargaining setting), appeal dismissed, 864 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1988); DeSapio v.
Josephthal & Co., 143 Misc. 2d 611, 617-18, 540 N.Y.S.2d 932, 937 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(holding claims under § 296 of the New York Human Rights Law arbitrable in
non-collective bargaining setting).
86. Congress found that "the continued well-being and security of mil-
lions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee
benefit] plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). In fact, the majority of American
workers and their dependents rely on employee benefit plans for their welfare
and retirement security. Powers, The Crime of the Eighties: Employee Bene-
fits Fund Abuse, 15 J. PENSION PLAN. & CODYPLLANCE 115, 116 (1989). See also
SuBcommIsrrrE ON OvRsiGiiT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF TBE SENATE
CommIT1r ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 99tH CONG., 2D SEss., THE DEPART-
mENT OF LABOR'S ENFORCEMENT OF EpLoYEE RE' iENT INcOME SEcumTry
ACT 43, 71 (Con. Print 1986) (listing statistic on EUSA participation); Lilly,
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. U J. 603, 604 (1984)
(discussing initial ERISA participation).
87. ERISA's text begins by highlighting Congress's recognition of the
"rapid and substantial" growth in "size, scope, and numbers of employee bene-
fit plans in recent years." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a); see Lilly, supra note 86, at 604;
EMPLOYEE BENEFTrS RESEAICH INSnITUTE, EBRI QUARTERLY PENSION INvEsT-
mENT REPORT, Second Quarter 1987, Vol. 2, No. 2, Oct. 1987. Private pension
plan assets hold over 25% of all stocks on the New York Stock Exchange(NYSE). Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 5; see also Note, ERISA- Punitive
Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 743, 743
(1984-85) (citing private pension plan assets as largest source of NYSE funds).
88. B. Coleman, Primer on ERISA xv (3d ed. 1989). Congressional investi-
gations uncovered widespread instances of incompetence, poor management,
inequitable administration, gross conflicts of interest, fraud, kickbacks, and
bribery. Malone, Ciminal Abuses in the Administration of Private Welfare
and Pension Plans: A Proposal for a National Enforcement Program, S. Iiz.
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table administration and financial soundness of employee
benefit plans, ERISA provides minimum standards for report-
ing and disclosure,90 participation and vesting,9 ' funding,92 and
fiduciary responsibility.93
Under ERISA's procedural provisions, willful violators of
the Act may face criminal penalties.9 ERISA's civil action pro-
U.L.J. 400, 414 (1976). Embezzement, self-dealing by administrators, and lack
of reasonable care and prudence in investing funds further added to substan-
tial depletions in plan assets. Ford, The Aftermath of Daniel: Private Pension
Plans, EIUSA, and the Federal Antraud Provisions, 46 Mo. L. REV. 51, 53 &
M9 (1981).
89. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988) and scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code at 26
U.S.C. (1988)).
Congress designed ERISA's comprehensive regulatory scheme to protect
the benefit rights and retirement security of plan participants and benefi-
ciaries. Schneider, supra note 71, at 272. Section 2(b) of the Act defines ER-
ISA's goal
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefits plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by pro-
viding for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
90. ERISA requires plan administrators to provide plan participants and
the federal government with understandable and accurate descriptions of the
terms and financial status of plans. ERISA §§ 101-111, 209, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-
1031, 1059.
91. I. §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
92. I& §§ 301-3o6, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086.
93. Id. §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1.14. In discharging his duties under
ERISA, a fiduciary must act
with the care, skill, prudence and diligence... that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like a ...
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent
not to do so.
Id. § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). While this standard might not demand a
higher degree of care than that required by the state statutory or common law
preempted by ERISA, the Act contains additional specific fiduciary require-
ments and prohibitions, mandating fiduciary compliance with ERISA's com-
plex and frequently ambiguous substantive provisions. Schneider, supra note
71, at 273 n.29; see also ERISA §§ 404-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1114 (discussing
the specific fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA).
94. ERiSA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 113L A person convicted of violating ER-
ISA's Title I reporting and disclosure provisions can be fined up to $5,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both. A corporate violator can receive
a fine of up to $100,000. Id-
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visions, however, are the primary ineans of enforcement.95 ER-
ISA provides for benefit claims as well as statutory claims for
violation of ERISA's substantive standards, including breach of
fiduciary responsibility.97 The federal district courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over suits involving the latter claims.98
ERISA includes a broad preemption provision, displacing
all state and local regulation and establishing the field of em-
ployee benefit plans as an exclusively federal concern.99 Recog-
95. Id. §§ 502-515,29 U.S.C. §§ 1132-1145. See also HR. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973) (House Committee on Education and Labor report
stating that "the principal focus of the enforcement effort [is] on anticipated
civil litigation ... by the Secretary of Labor as well as participants and benefi-
ciaries").
Congress relaxed venue requirements and procedural barriers for
ERISA civil actions and included liberal provisions for the award of attor
ney's fees and costs. ERISA §§ 502(e)(2),(f), (g)(I),(g)(2)(D), 29 U.S.C.§§ 1132(e) (2),(f),(g) (1),(g) (2) (D).
The intent of [Congress] is to... remove jurisdictional and procedural
obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective en-
forcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law or recovery of
benefits due to participants. For actions in federal courts, nationwide
service of process is provided in order to remove a possible procedural
obstacle to having all proper parties before the court.
S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1973); see also HR. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973) (same language).
96. ERISA benefit claims are contractually-based. A plan participant or
beneficiary may bring a civil action to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clar-
ify rights to future benefits under the terms of an employee benefit plan; ER-
ISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). ERISA also requires every
employee benefit plan to "afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant
whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the ap-
propriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim." Id. § 503(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1133(2). The Department of Labor has issued a regulation endorsing
the use of grievance and arbitration procedures created by a collective bargain-
ing agreement as a permissible means of complying with this internal claims
review requirement. See 29 C.F.P § 2560.503-(b)(2)(i) (1985). State and fed-
eral district courts have concurrent jurisdiction in these benefit claims suits.
ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
97. A plan participant a beneficiary, a fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor
may bring a civil action for violation of ERISA's substantive standards. ER-
ISA § 502(a)(2)-(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(5). The Secretary of Labor also has
the discretionary right to intervene in any fiduciary breach action, and both
the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury may intervene in
suits claiming violation of any other substantive provision. I& § 502(h), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(h).
98. Id. § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
99. ERISA § 514(a) provides: "[Tihe provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter HI of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan...." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a).
Congress determined that "the interests of uniformity with respect to in-
terstate plans required... the displacement of State action in the field of pri-
ARBITRATION
nizing that ERISA's statutory provisions were insufficient to
establish the comprehensive regulatory scheme desired, Con-
gress empowered the federal courts to develop a body of federal
common law to supplement the statutory scheme, to develop
the general standards set forth, and to fill the gaps created by
preemption.co
D. JUDICIAL A'rEmpTs TO RECONCILE ERISA PoLIcIEs WITH
DEFERENCE TO ARBITRATION
ERISA pension plans must include claims procedures pro-
viding participants an opportunity for internal review of benefit
claim denials by plan administrators.101 Courts have uniformly
held that a participant's failure to exhaust internal review pro-
vate employee benefit programs." 120 CoNG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Javits, a principal sponsor of ERISA). See also H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973):
[Mithout... access to the courts, and without standards by
which a participant can measure the fiduciary's conduct he is not
equipped to safeguard either his own rights or the plan assets. Fur-
thermore, a fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation...
will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under
the same set of facts may differ from state to state....
Finally, it is evident that the operations of employee benefit plans
are increasingly interstate. The uniformity of decision which the Act
is designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and partici-
pants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity
of reference to varying state laws.
Remarks made in floor debates on the final conference report further evi-
dence Congress's recognition of the necessity of uniformity. See, eg., 120
CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (Congressman Dent's statement that "[w]ith the pre-
emption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by
eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local
regulation").
100. See Ray & Halpern, The Common Law of ERISA, TRnIA June, 1985, at
20, 21 (citing Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496 1498-
1500 (9th Cir. 1984)). The late Senator Javits, a principal sponsor of ERISA,
stated that "it is ... intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations
under private welfare and pension plans." 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974); see
also Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 799 n.5 (6th Cir.) (stating that Congress
intended ERISA's preemption provision to create a body of federal substantive
law regulating pension plans), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985).
101. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988). According to regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor covering minimal acceptable proce-
dures for internal claims review, grievance and arbitration procedures estab-
lished in a collective bargaining agreement and incorporated into the pension
plan appeals process constitute compliance with the minimum standards. 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b)(2)(i)(A),(B) (1989). Unlike internal claims procedures,
however, arbitration provides for final review. Note, Civil Actions Under ER-
ISA Section 502(a): When Should Courts Require Tat Claimants Exhaust Ar.-
bitral or Intr.fund emedies?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 952, 953 n.7 (1986).
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cedures for benefit claims bars a subsequent civil action, 02 but
disagree as to the necessity of this exhaustion requirement for
substantive ERISA claims. 0 3
Similarly, courts disagree over whether a plaintiff alleging
an ERISA statutory violation may file suit in federal court de-
spite a prior agreement to submit disputes to arbitration.1°4 In
1985, the Third Circuit in Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co.105 held that statutory ERISA claims, unlike contractually-
based benefit claims under an ERISA plan, are not subject to
compulsory arbitration notwithstanding an agreement to arbi-
trate.1°6 In 1988, however, the Eighth Circuit in Arnuzfo P. Su-
102. Note, supra note 101, at 958. See, e.g., Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559,
566-67 (9th Cir. 1980); Worsowicz v. Nashua Corp., 612 F. Supp. 310, 315(D.N.H. 1985); Ridens v. Voluntary Separation Program, 610 F. Supp. 770, 778
(D. Mlinn. 1985).
103. Note, supra note 101, at 958-59. See, eg., Mason v. Continental Group,
Inc, 763 F.2d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986)
(holding employees' statutory ERISA suit barred by employees' failure to ex-
haust arbitral procedures provided in pension plan agreement); Kross v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding plaintiff's failure
to exhaust internal review procedures in ERISA pension plan barred § 510
civil suit). But see Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747,751-52 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding Kross flawed and refusing to follow its exhaustion requirement
for statutory ERISA claims); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 1492, 1504 (D.N.J. 1985) (declining to require exhaustion for statutory
ERISA claim).
104. Note, supra note 101, at 959-60; see also Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am.
Express, Inc, 871 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir.), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989) (holding
statutory ERISA claims not compulsorily arbitrable despite valid commercial
arbitration agreement); Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923,
941 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that despite contractual agreement to arbitrate dis-
putes arising out of employment, plaintiff need not arbitrate substantive ER-
ISA violation); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 271, 278 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding former employee may bring civil suit
for substantive ERISA violations because prospective agreements to arbitrate
ERISA claims are invalid). But see Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475,479 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding investor must arbitrate ER-
ISA fiduciary breach claim given valid predispute arbitration agreement).
105. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985).
106. Id- at 941. The Third Circuit determined that ERISA's enactment re-
quired accommodation of its policy of federal court access and federal law
remedies for pension plan participants with the FAA's policy favoring enforce-
ment of arbitral agreements. Id. at 939. The court concluded that-
[Tihe most reasonable accommodation is to hold that claims to estab-
lish or enforce rights to benefits under [an ERISA plan] that are in-
dependent of claims based on violations of the substantive provisions
of ERISA are subject to arbitration ... while claims of statutory vio-
lations can be brought in a federal court notwithstanding an agree-
ment to arbitrate.
Id (citations omitted).
The court based its decision primarily on three grounds. First, the court
A.RBITRATION
Zi# Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc10 held that a valid
arbitration agreement compelled arbitration of plaintiff's ER-
ISA claim, regardless of its statutory nature108
On the related issue of deference to administrative results
following exhaustion of intrafund procedures or arbitration,
courts typically uphold benefit claims denials? 09 But again,
courts disagree on the appropriate degree of deference to ac-
cord administrative results when statutory ERISA claims are
involved.' 0
pointed out that the deliberate parallel Congress drew between ERISA con-
tractual claims and contractually-based claim for breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement under the LMRA revealed that Congress intended
contractually-based pension claims to be similarly subject to arbitration. Id.
Next, relying on the Supreme Court's Barrentine andAlezander decisions, the
court likened ERISA's substantive protections and minimum standards for
workers to substantive rights in the FLSA and Title VI claims which the
Supreme Court held were not subject to compulsory arbitration. I& at 940-41.
Finally, the court determined that arbitration of statutory lims would frus-
trate Congress's goal to provide a consistent source of law to aid plan fiducia-
ries and participants in predicting the legality of proposed actions. I& at 941.
107. 847 F2d 475 (8th Cir. 1988).
108. IL at 477. The plaintiff in Sulit argued that his ERISA claims were
not amenable to arbitration because "they are 'Purely statutory,' require inter-
pretation of a complex statutory scheme, and are generally beyond an arbitra-
tor's competence." Id. Rejecting these arguments, the Third Circuit relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. Mc-
Mahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Sulit court reasoned that the FAA dictated
enforcement of plaintiff's arbitration agreement unless he satisfied "the bur-
den placed on him as the party opposing arbitration to show 'Congress in-
tended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue." 847 F.2d at 478 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (1987)).
The court applied the "arbitrability test" announced in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Ic., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985) and followed in
McMahon, see supra note 42, and concluded that the plaintiff failed to satisfy
its burden. The court found nothing in the legislative history of ERISA indi-
cating a congressional intent to single out ERISA claims for exemption from
the federal policy embodied in the FAA. SulZit, 847 F.2d at 478-79. Further-
more, the McMahon decision had considered and rejected as insufficient simi-
lar arguments concerning arbitrator competence and limited judicial review.
Id at 479 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232). The court finally concluded that,
given recent Supreme Court decisions enforcing arbitration agreements for an-
titrust, Exchange Act, and RICO claims, it could find no compelling basis to
treat ERISA claim differently. IE
109. Note, supra note 101, at 961-62. Courts reach this result by either ap-
plying the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review when re-
viewing benefit denials following exhaustion of intrafund procedural review or
by refusing to review the merits of the claim following an arbitral decision. Id-
at 962.
1.0. Id; see also King v. James River-Pepperell, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 54, 56
(D. Mass. 1984) (deferring to prior administrative results in a subsequent ER-
ISA civil suit alleging a statutory claim). But see Amaro v. Continental Can
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II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN BIRD: AN
ATTEMPT TO KEEP ERISA BEYOND
ARBITRATION'S REACH
The Second Circuit in Bird, relying in part on the reason-
ing of the Third Circuit in Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co." and expressly rejecting the more recent Eighth Circuit
opinion in Arnu~fo P. Sulit Ina v. Dean Witter Reynoc,
Inc.,n 2 held that statutory ERISA claims are not compulsorily
arbitrable, notwithstanding a valid commercial arbitration
agreement-'n 3 Based on the Supreme Court's test for the arbi-
trability of statutory claims" 4 and on existing Supreme Court
precedent in the labor arbitration setting," 5 the Second Circuit
concluded that those asserting substantive ERISA violations
cannot be denied access to a federal judicial forum." 6 In so
holding, the court specifically distinguished statutory ERISA
claims from benefit claims based on a particular ERISA plan,
characterizing the latter as purely contractual" T and subject to
compulsory arbitration." 8
The court began its analysis by recognizing the mandate of
Co., 724 F.2d 747, 753 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding binding arbitral decision not res
judicata in a subsequent ERISA § 510 suit).
111. Bird, 871 F.2d at 297 (citing Barrowclough, 752 F.2d at 941, for its find-
ing that a federal judicial forum is essential to ensuring minimum standards
guaranteed by ERISA); see also i. at 297-98 (citing Barrowcough's analogy
between ERISA and LMRA); supm note 106 (discussing the Barrowclough
decision).
112. The Second Circuit declared that "to the extent the Sulit court could
'find no hint in the legislative history' of Congress' intent that substantive ER-
ISA claims not be subject to compulsory arbitration, we disagree.' Bird, 871
F.2d at 298 n.8 (quoting Sulit, 847 F.2d at 478-79); see also supra note 108 (dis-
cussing the Sulit decision).
113. Bird, 871 F.2d at 294.
14. See supra note 42.
115. See i fra notes 125-28.
116. The court concluded that "a federal judicial forum cannot be cut off to
those asserting claims created as part of a comprehensive federal scheme pro-
tecting the rights of individual participants or beneficiaries of a pension plan
and which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts." Bird,
871 F.2d at 298.
117. The court noted that ERISA's jurisdictional provisions "distinguish
between suits brought to redress violations of substantive provisions of ERISA
and actions to declare the rights of those covered and benefits due under a par-
ticular pension plan." Id at 297 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)).
118. The court declared it was not suggesting "that arbitration of purely
contractual claims asserted pursuant to ERISA cannot be compelled. Suits to
establish or enforce rights to benefits that are independent of claims predi-
cated on substantive violations of ERISA are appropriately resolved through
arbitration." Id. at 298.
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the F.A.A." 9 The Second Circuit proceeded to determine, how-
ever, that under the Mitsubishi "arbitrability test"'2  substan-
tive ERISA claims are not subject to mandatory arbitration;' 2 '
ERISA's text,"2 its legislative historym and its overall pol-
119. Id. at 295 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
120. See ic. (outlining the Supreme Court's test announced in Mitsubishi
for determining the arbitrability of a statute); see a7so supnm note 42 (describ-
ing the elements of the Mitsubishi test).
12L Bird, 871 F.2d at 296-98.
122. The court found that ERISA's plain language '"madat[gng] 'ready ac-
cess to the federal courts"' clearly evidenced Congress's intent that the fed-
eral courts be a "key ingredient" in the protection of plan participants and the
central forum for ERISA's enforcement. I& at 297 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)). The court also highlighted ERISA's liberal provisions for service of
process, venue, attorney fees, and statutes of limitations as well as the right of
the Secretary of Labor to maintain an action on behalf of a plan participant or
beneficiary as further evidence of congressional intent to prevent waiver of ac-
cess to the courts. I&1
123. The court relied on the House Conference Report's statement that
LMRA § 301 be a model for the operation of ERISA § 1132(e), the jurisdic-
tional provision for ERISA claims. I& at 297-98 (citing HR. CoNF. REP. No.
1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, rep2inted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhN.
NEWS 5038, 5107). Section 301 permits suit in state or federal court for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement. Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, courts have held such claims
subject to mandatory arbitration. Id. Relying on the Bar7owclough court's
reasoning, tle Second Circuit concluded that the reference in ERISA's legisla-
tive history to LMRA § 301 demonstrated Congress's intent that ERISA bene-
fit claims, analogous to contractually-based claims for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement, likewise be subject to arbitration. Birc, 871 F.2d at 298.
The court also noted that, regardless of the forum, federal common law gov-
erns § 301 caims because the importance of federal labor policy and the need
for uniformity in labor dispute resolution have required the development of a
body of federal legal principles. Id- The Second Circuit concluded that, based
on the reference to § 301 and on Congress's declaration that employee pension
plan law is "affected with a national public interest" Congress likewise envi-
sioned the development of federal common law to govern ERISA claims. Id(quoting the ERISA prologue, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)).
Barrowcough, on which Bird generally relies, took the issue of ERISA-
based federal common law further. The Third Circuit pointed out that ERISA
§ 514(a), see supra note 99, preempts any state law relating to ERISA pension
plans, and concluded that "[iln enacting ERISA, Congress authorized the
evolution of a federal common law of pension plans." Barrowelougih, 752 F.2d
at 936 (quoting Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1980)).
The court further found that arbitration of statutory issues would be:
inconsistent with Congress' goal, evident in the jurisdictional and pre-
emption provisions of ERISA, to provide a consistent source of law to
'help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legal-
ity of proposed actions;... This intent would be frustrated if arbitra-
tors, who are not bound to consider law or precedent in their
decisions, and who decide issues primarily on contractual grounds,
had a conclusive role in deciding such claims.
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icy 2 all reflect a congressional intent to preclude waiver of ju-
dicial remedies.
In addition to the "arbitrability test," the Second Circuit
relied on three Supreme Court labor arbitration decisions
which had held three different statutory claims not compulso-
rily arbitrable.'2 5 The Second Circuit noted that Congress has
prohibited waiver of the judicial forum most often in "statutes
designed to provide minimurm substantive guarantees. '"2S The
court also stated that the Alezander and Barrentine decisions
rested in part on the arbitrator's unique role in effectuating the
parties' intent under their contract, a function that undermined
the statutory goals at issue; this concern applied equally to ER-
ISA.127 Finally, according to the Second Circuit, McDonald il-
lustrated the concerns underlying Congress's desire to maintain
access to judicial forums for certain federal substantive rights,
concerns also applicable to ERISA.ms
Id. at 941 (quoting S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4888, 4865).
124. The court believed that a conflict existed between arbitration and the
policies underlying ERISA. By characterizing ERISA as a remedial statute
designed to protect participants from benefit plan abuse, and citing several de-
cisions construing access to a federal judicial forum as "essential to assuring
the minimum standards" guaranteed by ERISA, the court reasoned that arbi-
tration frustrated ERISA's remedial intent. Bird, 871 F.2d at 296-97 (citing
Barrowlough, 752 F.2d at 941; Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747,752
(9th Cir. 1984); Senco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902, 908 (M.D. Fa.
1979); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271,
276 (ED. Pa. 1977)).
125. Id at 295-96; see also supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Alezander trilogy: McDonald, Barrentine, and Alexander).
126. Id. at 295 (citing Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737 (holding FLSA minimum
wage claims not compulsorily arbitrable, based in part on statutory purpose to
provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers)). Similarly,
the Second Circuit found that ERISA was a remedial statute designed to curb
employee pension plan abuses by establishing minimum federal standards to
secure pension plan payments to participants. Id. at 296-97.
127. Id at 295-96. The Supreme Court determined that the arbitrator's
"task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of
enacted legislation." Id. at 296 (quoting AZeander, 415 U.S. at 56-57). Given
the remedial character of ERISA, the Second Circuit concluded that "[t]he re-
medial intent of Congress tempers the right to privately order one's affairs."
Id. In other words, an arbitrator might frustrate ERISA's underlying remedial
purpose by subordinating it to contrary terns of the parties' agreement.
128. Id. The McDonald decision listed considerations supporting the
Court's conclusion that binding arbitration did not bar § 1983 claims from fed-
eral court. The list included the arbitrator's possible lack of requisite exper-
tise to resolve complex legal questions, and the Court's belief that "arbitral
factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding." IH. (citing Mc-
Donald, 466 U.S. at 290-91).
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The Bird dissent faulted the majority for failing to follow
the Supreme Court's recent decisions upholding the "federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements," regardless of a claim's
statutory basis?-2 The dissent further declared that the only
cognizable basis for the majority's decision was its belief that
arbitrators "are not up to the task," an untenable assumption
given recent Supreme Court rulings.' 30
Shearson sought Supreme Court review of the Second Cir-
cuit's decision. Granting certiorari, the Court in a 5-3 decision
disposed of Bird simply by vacating the judgment and remand-
ing the case to the Second Circuit "for further consideration in
light of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Eapress,
Inc."'' The three dissenters also provided no commentary. 32
The Second Circuit in turn remanded the case to the district
court, directing the court to proceed according to the Supreme
Court's mandate.
III. BIRD'S MISGUIDED REASONING
The Second Circuit erred in holding statutory ERISA
claims exempt from compulsory arbitration. The .Supreme
Court's summary remand in light of Rodriguez strongly sug-
gests that ERISA claims are subject to compulsory arbitration.
The Rodriguez decision alone does not compel this conclusion
because it did not address legitimate policy concerns the Second
Circuit raised particular to ERISA, nor did it provide novel af-
firmative grounds to support the arbitrability of statutory ER-
ISA claims. Modem commercial arbitration jurisprudence
taken as a whole, however, does so mandate.
In fact, had the Second Circuit thoroughly considered the
Supreme Court's recent commercial arbitration decisions,
although prior to release of the Rodriguez decision, it could
have and should have determined that statutory ERISA claims
29. Bird, 871 F.2d at 298 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (citing Moses EL
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The dis-
sent further argued that since neither the ERISA text nor its legislative his-
tory even mentions arbitration, the majority's findings on these points were
unsupported. Id. at 299.
130. Id. at 300 (citing Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
231-32 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985);
Moses H. Cone, 480 U.S. at 24). The dissent concluded that, having signed a
valid agreement, Bird should be held to his bargain since Congress gave "no
hint that [it] planned to deprive him of that option." I&
131. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc. v. Bird, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989).
132. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented. Id.
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are no less subject to arbitration than statutory securities
claims. Instead, the court erroneously relied primarily on the
older Akxander trilogy cases from the labor arbitration con-
text, arguably inapposite to the issue. By vacating and remand-
ing Bird in light of its most recent commercial arbitration
decision, the Supreme Court implicitly signalled that the Sec-
ond Circuit erred in failing to focus on the more recent
developments in commercial arbitration jurisprudence. Fur-
thermore, careful examination of the Second Circuit's particu-
larized ERISA policy concerns vis-a-vis arbitration reveals
their illusory nature as well.
A. INADEQUACY OF RODRIGUEZ ALONE To COMPEL BmRD'S
REVERSAL
The FAA established a presumption that statutory claims
are subject to commercial arbitration.133 Courts must apply the
Mitsubishi "arbitrability test," however, to ascertain whether
the requisite congressional intent exists to override this pre-
sumption for a given statutei's Mere reference to the arbitra-
ble status of a different statute is generally insufficient to
determine the issue of arbitrability because each statute has its
own unique text, legislative history, and underlying purposes.
Therefore, Rodriguez alone was insufficient to overturn Bird
because Rod?iguez dealt specifically with the Securities Act of
1933, not with ERISA, and effectively addressed only a few of
the Second Circuit's arguments and concerns.
Rodiguez, however, did refute that portion of the Bird de-
cision resting on ERISA's liberal provisions for service of pro-
cess, venue, and amount in controversy?3 In Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court held that the Securities Act's procedural provi-
sions,es6 while admittedly facilitating suits by securities buy-
ers,'3 were present in other federal statutes that the Court had
133. See supra note 41.
134. See supra note 42.
135. See supra note 122. See also sup=r note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing the Rodriguez decision).
136. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the decision overruled by Rodri-
quez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989), high-
lighted as critical to the protection of securities buyers under the Securities
Act several specific procedural improvements: "broad venue provisions in the
federal courts; the existence of nationwide service of process in the federal
courts; the extinction of the amount-in-controversy requirement ... ; and the
grant of concurrent jurisdiction in the state and federal courts without possi-




interpreted as not prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration
agreementsP8 The Second Circuit's use of similar procedural
provisions to support ERISA's nonarbitrability is therefore
untenable.Y9
The Bird court's reliance on ERISA's grant of exclusive
federal jurisdiction for statutory claims, as opposed to the con-
current jurisdiction allowed for benefit claims,140 also suffered
a blow from the Rodriguez decision. The Supreme Court noted
in Rodriguez that the Exchange Act's exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion provision did not preclude a finding of arbitrability in Mc-
Mahon.m4 . Beyond countering the foregoing specific and very
limited arguments in Bird, Rodriguez provided little novel gui-
dance in deciding the issue presented in Bird.
B. THE SECOND CIRcur's DisREGARD OF COMMERCiAL
AwmnRATION PRECEDENTS
The Supreme Court has declared that an individual does
not lose his substantive rights under a statute by agreeing to
submit a statutory claim to arbitrationW Exemplifying this as-
sertion, the Court found first in Scberk,143 again in MeMa-
hon, 44 and most recently in Rodriguez'45 that arbitration was
an adequate means to enforce the provisions of both the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act and to protect the substantive
rights under each act. By analogizing statutory ERISA claims
to claims under the securities acts, a strong affirmative ground
138. Id. at 1920-21 (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (construing the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78 aa); id. (construing the RICO statutes, 18
U.S.C. § 1965); and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plynouth, Inc,
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (construing the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15)); see also
supr note 67 (discussing the Rodriguez decision).
139. By analogy, ERISA's liberal statute of limitations provision must like-
wise fall to the Rodriguez reasoning as it too is merely another procedural pro-
vision designed to facilitate suits by aggrieved parties under ERISA.
140. See supra notes 96, 98, & 123.
141. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921. See also supra note 67 (discussing the
Rodriguez decision).
The Court's reasoning in Rodriguez does not refute Bird's legislative his-
tory argument, however, regarding Congress's reference to LMRA § 301 as a
model only for ERISA benefits claims. See supra note 123.
142. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. The Court asserted that "[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum."
143. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text
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emerges upon which to base the arbitrability of statutory ER-
ISA claims.
Significant parallels exist between ERISA and the securi-
ties acts. Congress enacted ERISA to protect pension plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries from abuses perceived in the private
pension plan system,14 just as it enacted the securities laws to
protect investors from abuses perceived in the securities indus-
try.1 47 One lower court observed that a pension plan partici-
pant is in effect a securities investor, making his investments
indirectly through his pension plan.14 8 This is a fair analogy
that remains sound today. Given this parallel, arbitration pro-
cedures that adequately protect the securities investor's claims
under the securities laws likewise should adequately protect a
pension plan participant's claims under ERISA, particularly if
those claims flow from alleged misconduct in the securities
industry.
The Supreme Court in McMahon reviewed at length the
adequacy of current arbitration procedures for securities
claims. 149 In exercising its regulatory authority,s ° the SEC has
146. See supra note 88.
147. See supra note 33.
148. Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp.
271, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The court observed that the pension plan participant
intends that his interest in his pension will support him after retirement "just
as though he had purchased securities directly for the same purpose with
money given him as salary or wages in lieu of employer contributions to the
pension plan." I&
The district court in Lewis was actually drawing this analogy to show that
statutory ERISA claims should not be arbitrable, the opposite result that the
Supreme Court apparently desires to reach in Bird. At the time of the Lewis
decision in 1977, the court could successfully use the analogy to support its
holding because the Supreme Court had not yet overruled Wilko, nor had it
decided McMaho-n. Therefore, securities investors at the time did occupy a
special shield of protection against compulsory arbitration. Given the prece-
dent that exists today, however, the analogy can now support the opposite po-
sition for the same reasons that it worked in Lewis.
149. See Mci!ahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34.
150. In 1975 Congress amended the Exchange Act, giving the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) extensive authority over the arbitration pro-
cedures of self-regulatory organizations ("SROs') - the national securities ex-
changes and registered securities associations - to ensure the adequacy of
these procedures. IH Before enactment of these amendments, the SEC had
only limited authority over the rules governing the SROs and no authority at
all over their arbitration procedures. I&, at 233. The amendments to § 19 of
the Exchange Act give the Commission broad authority to oversee and regu-
late rules that the SROs adopt concerning customer disputes, "including the
power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that
arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." Id- at 234.
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specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the organi-
zations involved in McMahon, procedures that are identical to
those in the Bird brokerage agreement.15  The MeMahon
Court concluded that if the prescribed arbitration procedures
are subject to the SEC's regulatory authority, an arbitration
agreement does not result in a waiver of the protections of the
Exchange Act.'52 Because rules for the arbitration of claims
under the Securities Act fall under the same broad authority of
the SEC, the Court applied the McMahon reasoning by refer-
ence in Rodriguez to hold that the arbitration procedures also
adequately protect statutory rights under the Securities Act.153
Based on the Supreme Court's determination that current
securities industry arbitration procedures adequately protect
the rights of aggrieved investors under the securities laws,
these procedures likewise must be sufficient to protect the
rights of aggrieved parties under ERISA who are claiming that
securities industry personnel have breached ElkISA's fiduciary
standards. Consistent with this reasoning, the Eighth Circuit,
upholding the arbitrability of ERISA claims, recently found
that arbitrators are quite capable of handling ERISA's
complexities.j '
The Supreme Court's remand of Bird in light of its most
recent commercial arbitration decision, notably in the securities
area, further supports the conclusion that commercial arbitra-
tion in the securities industry adequately and equally protects
all securities investors, whether they are investing individually
or through an ERISA pension plan. This analogy provides a
sound affirmative basis for holding that statutory ERISA claims
for breach of fiduciary duty are arbitrable. When the Second
Circuit decided Bird, sufficient Supreme Court precedent in the
commercial arbitration realm already existed to firmly support
such reasoning,'5 yet the Second Circuit improperly disre-
garded it. The Rodriguez decision relied heavily on these ex-
151. The organizations are the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers. I&i See,
aZso supra note 2 (setting forth the arbitration provision in the customer
agreement at issue in Bird).
152. McMa lon, 482 U.S. at 234.
153. See supra note 67 (discussing the Rodriguez decision).
154. Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc, v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475, 479
(8th Cir. 1988); see supra note 108 (discussing the Sulit decision).




isting decisions,1 6 and its arrival merely reinforced an already
sound basis for a Bird decision in favor of ERISA arbitration.
C. UNFOUNDED CONCERN OVER FRUSTRATION OF ERISA
POLICY
Because Rodriguez dealt with the Securities Act of 1933,
neither it nor the Supreme Court's other commercial arbitra-
tion cases, on which Rodriguez specifically relied, addressed
three of the Second Circuit's arguments particular to ERISA.
The Second Circuit was concerned that a contrary holding
would frustrate the congressional goal of a uniform body of fed-
eral common law governing ERISA, 5 7 the Secretary of Labor's
right to bring statutory ERISA claims on behalf of a participant
or beneficiary,lss and congressional intent that remedial stat-
utes providing individual minimum substantive guarantees be
accorded nonwaivable consideration in a judicial forum. 5 9
1. Uniformity Under ERISA
Both the Second Circuit in Bird and the Third Circuit in
Barrowclough pointed out Congress's recognition of the need
for development of a uniform federal common law under ER-
ISA.' 60 The Barrowc7ough decision emphasized the inconsis-
tency between this goal and the arbitration of statutory ERISA
claims.' 6 '
Congress did recognize the importance of providing uni-
form guidance to participants, beneficiaries, adminitrators, and
fiduciaries of ERISA plans. 62 Some commentators, akin to the
Barrowclough court, have submitted that allowing the arbitra.
tion of substantive ERISA claims will frustrate this congres-
sional intent. 163 A finding of arbitrability in Bird, however,
156. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct at 1920-21; see supra notes 67 & 136-38 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Rodriguez decision).
157. See supn note 123 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 122.
159. See supra notes 124-28. The Barrowc1ough court also raised this con-
cern in its decision to preclude arbitration of an ERISA statutory claim.
160. See supra note 123. Several excerpts from ERISA's legislative history
not cited by the Second Circuit further support this contention. See sUPr
notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
161. See supmr note 123. The Second Circuit in Bird relied substantially on
the Barrowclougz court's reasoning, although not always reiterating it in
detail.
162. See supru notes 99-100 and accompanying text
163. See Schneider, supmra note 71, at 285 (goal of ERISA's federal preemp-
tion to help predict legality of proposed actions would be negated if traditional
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would not necessarily frustrate this congressional goal because
it would in no way hold that such claims must be resolved ex-
clusively by arbitration. Only in those cases where parties had
entered into a valid commercial arbitration agreement that ink
cluded.ERISA claims in its scope would arbitration of statutory
ERISA claims be mandated. Many statutory ERISA claims
would still make their way into the federal courts,'64 and the
resulting judicial decisions would develop the desired gap-fill-
ing common law.
Arbitrators faced with statutory ERISA claims, as with
other arbitrable statutory claims,16s are "readily capable of
arbitration were permitted because arbitrators not bound to consider either
law or precedent); see also Note, supra note 101, at 974 (because judges are
bound by precedent and must state reasons for decisions, they are "more likely
to formulate -clear, articulate, unorm standards of conduct").
164. ERISA's civil enforcement provisions grant several parties the right to
sue for substantive violations of the Act. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1988). The Bird case, while casting a broad net due to securities industry
practice, leaves many potential claims for substantive ERISA violations un-
touched. As long as the parties to the dispute do not have an arbitration
agreement, the federal district courts retain exclusive jurisdiction.
Also, until the Supreme Court provides further guidance, a reversal of
Bird's holding should not preclude access to federal court for such claims aris-
ing in the labor realm. The Bird case deals with a predispute arbitration
clause in a commercial contract, as does Rodriguez, and its holding should be
confined to ERISA disputes in the commercial arbitration context. Labor arbi-
tration differs from commercial arbitration in significant respects. Most nota-
bly, an aggrieved party under a collective bargaining clause must surrender his
claim to the union's exclusive control Emphasizing this distinction, the Alev-
ander, Barrentine, and McDonald decisions all found that in labor arbitration
the union may properly subordinate the interests of the individual employee
to the collective interests of the employees as a whole. See supra note 83.
Thus, an aggrieved party might lose his statutory right if not in the union's
best interest to pursue his claim vigorously. Id.
In contrast, an ERISA claimant who is a party to a commercial arbitration
agreement retains complete control of her claim in the arbitration proceeding,
representing her own interests exclusively and independently. Based on this
critical distinction and existing Supreme Court precedent, courts should re-
frain from extending a reversed Bird decision into the labor area without ex-
press Supreme Court approval. By thus limiting Bird's reach, another source
of claims to aid in developing ERISA federal common law emerges: statutory
claims related to ERISA pension plans under collective bargaining
agreements.
165. The Supreme Court has enforced agreements between private parties
to arbitrate antitrust, Securites Act, Exchange Act, and RICO claims. See
supra notes 43-67 and accompanying text.
In holding antitrust claims arbitrable, the Court declared potential com-
plexity insufficient to ward off arbitration. Specifically, the Court determined
that "adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. The...
subject matter... may be taken into account when arbitrators are appointed,
and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either em-
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIW [Vol. 75:123
handling the factual and legal complexities" of the claims.L66
Presumably, commercial arbitrators follow the law in reaching
their decisions on statutory claims.1 67 Furthermore, although
judicial review of arbitration decisions is necessarily limited,
the FAA does not provide complete immunity from review.168
Therefore, far from eroding ERISA federal common law, arbi-
tral decisions on statutory ERISA claims will aid in maintain-
ing respect for this developing area of law.
2. Secretary of Labor's right to bring ERISA claims
Another Second Circuit concern that neither Rodriguez
nor the other Supreme Court commercial arbitration cases ad-
dressed is Congress's grant to the Secretary of Labor of the
right to intervene on behalf of a plan participant or beneficiary
in an action based on a statutory ERISA claim. 69 Dispute reso-
lution in the arbitral forum effectively destroys the Secretary's
ability to exercise the right to intervene, and hence appears to
remove an added protection that Congress intended. This pro-
tection, however, is analogous to ERISA's numerous liberal
procedural protections which, as used in other statutes, have
not prevented the Court from allowing waiver of the judicial
ployed by the parties or appointed by the tribunal." Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985).
In McMahon, the Court relied in part on Mitsubishi to hold both Ex-
change Act and RICO claims arbitrable, recognizing that "arbitral tribunals
are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities .. ., notwith-
standing the absence of judicial instruction and supervision." McMahon, 482
U.S. at 232.
Applying these Supreme Court precedents to statutory ERISA claims, the
Eighth Circuit in Arnutfo P. Suit In v. Dean Witter ReynoWs, Ina held the
claims arbitrable. The court determined that "lmike other essentially fact-
based claims for fiduciary mismangement, we believe arbitrators 'are readily
capable of handling the factual and legal complexities' of ERISA claims, and
that those claims are not by their nature beyond the ken of arbitrators." Sulit,
847 F.2d at 479 (quoting McfMahon, 482 U.S. at 232).
166. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
167. The Supreme Court has indicated that "there is no reason to assume
at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law" in deciding statutory
claims. IH
168. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The McMahon Court
found the limited judicial review necessarily afforded arbitral decisions to be
sufficient in ensuring that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the
statute. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
169. See supra note 122. The Securities Act underlying Rodriguez does not
contain an analogous intervention provision, nor do any of the other statutes
under which the Supreme Court has found arbitrable statutory claims, L., Ex-
change Act, Sherman Act, and RICO.
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forum.1 0 Like the procedural protections, the Secretary's in-
tervention authority is not such an essential feature that ER-
ISA bars its waiver.17
Furthermore, because the Secretary of Labor was not a
party to the arbitration agreement, the Secretary retains the
right to bring a separate civil action against the alleged ERISA
violator in federal court notwithstanding a concurrent arbitra-
tion proceeding involving the same claim."'2 The Secretary can
only exercise this right, however, if the Secretary receives no-
tice that an 'ERISA plaintiff" is bringing a statutory ERISA
claim in a compulsory arbitration proceeding. ERISA requires
that the plaintiff in any action under ERISA serve a copy of the
complaint on the Secretary,"73 thereby effectuating the Secre-
tary's right to intervene at her discretion."' 4
If this notice provision is not applicable in the arbitration
context, the Secretary's right to bring suit may effectively be
denied, thereby removing an element Congress included as part
of ERISA's comprehensive regulatory scheme. Arguably, be-
cause this notice provision is directed to the ERISA plaintiff,
nothing prevents the plaintiff from voluntarily complying with
the provision notwithstanding his involvement in mandatory
arbitration. -Because the Secretary's right to intervene is essen-
tially for the protection of the plaintiff, the arbitration plaintiff
that fails to notify the Secretary in effect voluntarily waives the
potential aid of the Labor Department."'5
3. Congressional intent
The Second Circuit's third major concern was preservation
of Congress's intent that remedial statutes providing individual
minimum substantive guarantees, including ERISA, be ac-
170. See sup= notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
171. See Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1920 (stating that the Securities Act's.Iib-
eral procedural provisions are not so essential to the Act that they may not be
waived).
172. See supm note 97.
173. ERISA § 502(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) (198).
174. Id-
175. Practically speaking, this potential aid may be largely illusory anyway.
The Secretary's right to intervene is discretionary and given the number of
ERISA complaints filed every year, the .Secretary can become actively in-
volved in only a small percentage. See, eg., Brennan, Private Pensions May Be
in TroubZe, Star Tribune (Minneapolis), Nov. 14,1989, at ID, col. 3 (discussing
an Associated Press investigation revealing the Labor Department's inability
to cope with the growth of the private pension system).
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corded nonwaivable access to a judicial forum.17 6 The court's
characterization of ERISA as remedial, however, does not in it-
self establish such congressional intent,177 and the Bird remand
strongly suggests that the Second Circuit's primary reliance on
the Supreme Court's decisions in Alexander, Barrentine, and
McDonald was improper.17
The propriety of relying on the Alexander trilogy arises be-
cause, although these decisions admittedly involved labor arbi-
tration under collective bargaining agreements, their holdings
were based only in part on reasoning exclusively applicable to
labor arbitration. The risk of subordination of individual inter-
ests to collective interests and the fact that the union exclu-
sively controls the suit differentiate statutory claims under
labor arbitration from those arising in commercial arbitra-
tion.1 79 The Supreme Court also based these decisions on rea-
soning independent of the collective bargaining context,
relating to the specialized character of each statute at issue.s °
The Second Circuit relied on these independent reasons, analo-
gizing ERISA's purpose and policies to those of Title VII, the
FLSA, and section 1983.181
The Supreme Court decided the Alexander trilogy cases
during a ten-year period ending in 1984, prior to issuing its re-
cent line of commercial arbitration decisions. 82 The Third Cir-
176. See supra. notes 83 & 126. The Barrowc1ough court shared this con-
cern and similarly relied on the Alexander trilogy for support. See supra note
106.
177. The Supreme Court in McMahoan characterized both the Exchange
Act and RICO as remedial statutes, but nonetheless held them both compulso-
rily arbitrable. Mclahon, 482 U.S. at 24041; see also SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (noting the "broadly remedial purposes of federal
securities legislation").
178. See supra notes 73.85 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 164.
180. The Court cited either the statute's constitutional dimensions, the
high priority Congress placed on it, or the individual minimum substantive
guarantees it provided. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
181. See supm notes 125-28 and accompanying text. The Bird court empha-
sized that "[tihe federal courts have consistently interpreted ERISA as a reme-
dial statute designed to 'curb the funding and disclosure abuses of employee
pension and welfare benefit plans by establishing minimum federal stan-
dards."' Bird, 871 F.2d at 297 (quoting Taggert Corp. v. Efros, 475 F. Supp. 124
(D. Tex 1978)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Pompano v. Michael
Shiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1982), the court had previ-
ously stated that "[a] reading of the statute's legislative history compels the
conclusion that ERISA's purpose is to secure guaranteed pension payments to
participants by insuring the honest administration o'f financially sound plans."
182. The Scher decision arrived in 1974, the same year as the Alexander
ARBITRATION
cuit's Barrowclough decision arrived in early 1985, also before
the commercial arbitration decisions, making reasonable that
court's reliance on the Alexander trilogy to hold ERISA statu-
tory claims not compulsorily arbitrablei8a Faced with the same
issue in 1988 in Sulit, the Eighth Circuit properly looked to the
commercial arbitration decisions for guidance, and held ERISA
claims arbitrablelM4 The Second Circuit in Bird, on the con-
trary, inexplicably glossed over modern commercial arbitration
jurisprudence in favor of the Alexander trilogy, even though
Bird involved a commercial arbitration agreement.les
The Supreme Court's vacation of judgment and remand of
the Bird case in light of Rodriguez clearly signals that the Sec-
ond Circuit improperly disregarded the commercial arbitration
decisions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's current unflag-
ging support for the FAA evinced in recent commercial arbitra-
tion decisions casts substantial doubt on the general
applicability of the Alexander cases. Three possible theories
may explain the flaw in the Second Circuit's primary reliance
on the trilogy. The Alexander decisions may apply only to the
specific statutes they address, the Supreme Court may recog-
nize their precedential value only in the labor arbitration
realm, or perhaps statutory ERISA claims simply fail to reach
the threshold necessary to activate the decisions. Although
Bird gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to clarify the dis-
tinctions between its labor arbitration and commercial arbitra-
tion decisions, the Supreme Court's summary remand
unfortunately has deferred this issue to the future, reducing
the foregoing theories to mere speculation.
Given the current uncertainty over the general applicabil-
ity of the Alexander trilogy,'-8 the Second Circuit's primary re-
liance on them was unreasonable. The court erred in failing to
give the Supreme Court's more recent commercial arbitration
decisions, particularly those involving statutory securities
claims, greater if not exclusive consideration. 87 The trend in
decision, but Scherk dealt with commercial arbitration in the international
context, arguably distinguishing it from the later domestic commercial arbitra-
tion cases all decided after the last AlXander trilogy case. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler - Plymouth, Inm, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); and Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
183. See supma note 106.
184. See sup-a note 108.
185. See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
186. See suprm notes 85 & 179-84 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
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modern commercial arbitration jurisprudence coupled with the
illusory nature of the Second Circuit's other ERISA policy con-
cerns outweigh any arguable analogy between ERISA and the
statutes at issue in the Aiecznder trilogy, given Bird's commer-
cial context.
CONCLUSION
Given the massive amounts of money invested in private
pension plans and the vast number of citizens relying on these
plans,lss Bird poses an issue of major significance. The Second
Circuit erred in holding statutory ERISA claims exempt from
compulsory arbitration. The Supreme Court's summary re-
mand of Bird in light of Rodrbiuez indicates that the Second
Circuit improperly disregarded recent commercial arbitration
precedent. The Rodriguez decision alone does not compel re-
versal, but modern commercial arbitration jurisprudence and
the federal policy favoring arbitration which it espouses, cou-
pled with the desire to protect all securities investors both ade-
quately and equally, mandates the enforcement of valid
commercial arbitration agreements for statutory ERISA claims.
The Bird remand also signals that the Second Circuit's primary
reliance on the AZexander trilogy was misguided; until the
Supreme Court clarifies the distinction between its commercial
arbitration and labor arbitration precedents, however, this as-
pect of the remand shall remain a mystery.
Susan C Davis
188. See supra notes 86-87.
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